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IN THE SUP'REME CO·URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE T. WORTHEN,
Pla4ntiff-Respondent,
vs.
SHURTLEFF and ANDREWS, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant,
vs.

Case No.
10651

THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
Successor of The Commission of
Finance, Administrator of The
State Insurance Fund,
Intervenor MliJ, Appellant.

1vi~c;rrt O~ UlAR

MAY 18 1967

Petition for Rehearin3,Aw uBAAR.l
And Brief in Support Thereof
ROBERT D. MOORE
422 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Intervenor
amd Appelloot
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EDWARD M. GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Building
·
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for PlaA!ntiff-Respondent
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
'r. WORTHEN,

)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
SHURTLEFF
and ANDREWS, INC., ,
.
a rorpora t ion,
\
Def end ant, \
BRUCE

VS.

,

Case No.
10651

THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
Surcessor of The Commission of
Finance, Administrator of The
State Insurance Fund,
Intervenor and Appellant.

Petition for Rehearing
Intervenor and Appellant respectfully petitions the
Court for Rehearing in the above entitled case for the
rea~ou that the holding of the Court failed to consider
material issues that should have been decided.
Dated this 28th day of April, 1967.
ROBERT D. MOORE
Attorney for Intervenor
amd Appella;n.t
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Brief in Support of
Petition for Rehearing
It appears clear that the effect of the majol'ity
decision in this case was to overrule the prior lltah (·;1;;r,
of McConnell v. Commission of Finance, 13 U.2d ~~J.J,
375 P.2d 394. This Court stated "we hm·e so conelndL•rl
cognizant of McConnell, 13 U .2d 395, 375 P.2d 3D+, i11
which the insurance carrier was not made a part>•, hut
insofar as this case may be inco11siste11t with l\lcConuell,
that case is overruled." It should be note<l that i11 drafling the Stipulation which was entered into lJy the partirs
at the District Court level, that the parties strn1ionsl)· srt
forth the same fact situation as was present in the :Jk
Connell case. It is respectfully suggested, thereforr, that
no distinctions can be made between the McConnell rase
and the present decision of this Court.
The purpose of this Petition is not to rel1Clsh the
arguments heretofore submitted by the parties, but
rather to ask for an amplification of certain problems
that are presented by the overruling of the :l\IcConncll
case. It is, ho\vever, respectfully urged that the abon
entitled case is in error. The Intenenor and Appellant
calls attention to 2 Darson Workman's Compe11satio11
Law (1961), Sec. 74.32 which points out that the :\IcConnell case sustains the majority of holdings of c:i;;tel'
states in regard to the problem of distrilmtio11 of tl1 1•
proceeds of a third party actio11.
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rr1w i11itial problem presented is the effect of the
language of the McConnell case, wherein the Court disrnsscd sub-section 2 of 35-1-62 U.C.A. 1953, as amended,
which provides, in part, as follows : " ... ( 2) the person
liabh, for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payment made.'' The Court concluded as
follows:

"Furthermore, subsection (2) requires that the
insurance carrier be reimbursed in full, providing,
of course, the amount of recovery is sufficient to
do so after payment of the legal expenses, including attorney's fees. If plaintiff were right in his
contention that an insurance carrier is liable for
its proportionate share of the costs and fees, then
an insurance carrier would never be reimbursed in
full." (Emphasis supplied in Court opinion)
Based upon this language, it was felt that the State
Insnrace Fund has a statutory right to reimbursement,
in full, when the amount recovered is sufficient to pay
legal expenses, and also to provide for total reimbursemrnt. 'l'herefore, it appeared clear that the Department
of Finance did not have authority to compromise subrogation claims against third parties. It is respectfully
submitted that the present case leaves open this question
hy its effect of overruling the l\icConnell case in total.
T!w State Insurance Fund is frankly at a loss in now
r1etermining whether or not it has authority to compromise claims \Vhieh may be beneficial to its interest in
a third party law suit. This issue is not academic in light
of an opinion given by the Attorney General on the 3rd
rlay of l\Iarch, 1965 ( Opi11io11 No. 65-015) wherein the
Attorne~· General, relying m part upon the McConnell
3

case, states that the Department of Finallce clues not
have authority to compromise subrogation claims and
holds that in the situation \Yhere there are sufficient
funds for the Insurance Fund to be paid in full, that
they have no authority to make such compromise. 111
fact, the Attorne~v General adYised that since tl1e fuuds
of the State Insurance Fund are not public· fm11Ls, lint
rather trust funds, that "those administering the FuuJ
might well be held liable personally for the amount <'Ompromised. '' It is, therefore, requested that this Petition
be granted in order that the question of whethrr or 11ot
the Director of Finance may compromise suhrngation
claims against third parties may be answered.
The Court, in its majority decision in this case, is
helpful in settling the issue of the question of the reasonableness of attorney fees by holding that the Trial Comt,
in this particular case, approved the contingent foe a~
being reasonable. We respectfully suggest, l10wever, that
there are additional unanswered questions that should
be resolved. For example, based upon the McConnell
case attorneys have paid, in many instances, the proportionate fee chargable to the Insurance Fund under
protest. The question presented then is whether or not
the Fund is required to refund the fees thus paid Hince
the 1\IcConnell case. Secondly, agreements with counsel
have been reached based upon the 1\IcCmmell case \Yhich
are now pending. The issue presented, therefore, is
whether or not the Fund is liable for such fees r-;inc<' i11
its agreement with counsel it made particular reforeJJ('C'
to the McConnell case.
4

Another issue which has been presented since the
Worthen case has been decided, is whether or not the
Insurance Fund is liable for the payment of attorney
fees based upon the total award made to an applicant or
rather a percentage based upon what has actually been
paid to an aplicant. For example, a widow may have re~eivcd an award of Sixteen-Thousand Dollars ($16,000)
11hich is to be paid over a number of years. At the time
of the settlement, pursuant to the provisions of the
award, only Ten-Thousand Dollars ($10,000) has been
paid. The question presented, therefore, is whether or
not the Insurance Fund is liable for twenty-five percent
(25'/o) of the Ten-Thousand Dollars or twenty-five percent of the Sixteen-Thousand Dollars.
The Intervenor and Appellant recognize that this
Co mt is not inclined, and rightly so, to set forth decisions
in the nature of a declaratory decision. It is the position
of Intervenor and Appellant, however, that when certain
consequences naturally flow from a decision that is subseqeuntly over-ruled, that this request is not improper
in order to avoid superfluous litigation. Therefore,
Intervenor and Appellant respectfully asks direction
from the Court in light of the holding of this case.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. MOORE
422 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Intervenor
and Appellant
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